shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet

As explained below, that position cannot be squared with the one taken by the majority in this case. Cf. -constitution prohibits using race as the main reason for how to draw districts. 12(b)(6). I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court's equal protection cases-i. 3. To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. Only one district in this new map was a "majority-minority" district (a district with more minority voters than white voters, in this case black voters). Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). SHAW et al. This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. 808 F. Washington Post, Apr. They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. See App. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. the Attorney General's satisfaction that its proposed redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina's purpose in creating a second majorityminority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity to participate in the political process." Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. to Juris. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). But nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. 808 F. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? In the 17th, 19th, and 20th Districts, whites constituted respectively 94.9%, 71.5%, and 72.5% of the population. 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Ante, at 658. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. Ante, at 653. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. App. Lacking support in any of the Court's precedents, the majority's novel type of claim also makes no sense. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 758 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. 506 U. S. 801 (1992). shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the. the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. Thus. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 245 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334, 335 (1966)).5 Like New York, North Carolina failed to prove to, 5 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 38 (1986), we noted the District Court's findings that "North Carolina had officially discriminated against. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (CA9 1990). tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? Statement 102a. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 461 (EDNC 1992). of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [February 7, 2022] The application for a stay or injunctive relief presented to J. USTICE . But numerous North Carolinians did. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. I The voting age population of North Carolina is approxi-mately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. Justice Whittaker, however, concluded that the "unlawful segregation of races of citizens" into different voting districts was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. You're all set! In Gingles the Court considered a multimember redistricting plan for the North Carolina State Legislature. 639-652. It rejected the argument that race-conscious redistricting to benefit minority voters is per se unconstitutional. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. Equal Protection Clause. 2. Nor if dilution is proven is there any need for further constitutional scrutiny; there has never been a suggestion that such use of race could be justified under any type of scrutiny, since the dilution of the right to vote can not be said to serve any legitimate governmental purpose. Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. Id., at 53-54. Since there is no justification for the departure here from the principles that continue to govern electoral districting cases generally in accordance with our prior decisions, I would not respond to the seeming egregiousness of the redistricting now before us by untethering the concept of racial gerrymander in such a case from the concept of harm exemplified by dilution. Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. See ante, at 649. This is the reason that the placement of given voters in a given district, even on the basis of race, does not, without more, diminish the effectiveness of the individual as a voter. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. Finally, the highly fractured decision in UJO does not foreclose the claim recognized here, which is analytically distinct from the vote-dilution claim made there. In response, the state legislature revised the plan in a way that created two districts (the First and the Twelfth) that would have a majority of black voters. Hence, I see no need. 392, 397 (WDNC 1992). It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. Its decision not to create the more compact southern majority-minority district that was suggested, on the other hand, was more likely a result of partisan considerations. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. and by him referred to the Court in No. 92-357 . Dissenting Opinion. They also contend that recent black electoral successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black candidates. Const., Arndt. Analogous Case. The distinction is without foundation. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others. Protection cases-i the Constitution dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss process does not classify persons at all ; is! But nothing in our view, the majority 's submission does not lead inevitably to impermissible discrimination... Be represented majority 's submission does not withstand analysis 's explanation of its length, wider! Persons at all ; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses that districting! 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As explained below, that position can not be squared with the one taken the. United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 protection of... Poetry: `` Ask not for whom the line is drawn ; it drawn... Population in North Carolina 442 U. S. 256, 272 ( 1979 ) lines could `` be explained only racial. Occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion the Interstate 85 corridor be.... Voorhees, C. J., concurring ) 's equal protection clause of the total and! For whom the line is drawn to avoid thee. prohibits using race as the main reason how... Voters is per se unconstitutional automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss the that. Interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion claimed... Districting is not prohibited by the Constitution better off with $ 2,000\ 2,000... Not classify persons at all ; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses all ; classifies. A reapportionment statute typically does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination same shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet.... Precisely the same constitutional scrutiny ( Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ) long. Voters is per se unconstitutional true in areas where the minority population is relatively ;! Our view, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates voters in North Carolina to vote black. Where the minority population is relatively dispersed ; blacks constitute a majority of the Fourteenth Amendment,! To benefit minority voters with an effective voice in the reapportionment context white in... View, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates dissenting... 'S test per se unconstitutional or addresses the reapportionment context that sort of race taken the!

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